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Biological Pluralism and Homology

Abstract.  Homology concepts are fundamental to the study of biological similarity.  Monistic attempts to articulate an overarching homology concept, applicable to all areas of biology, have yet to succeed.  Biology is fundamentally pluralistic, and multiple homology concepts, applicable at different levels of the biological hierarchy, allow a more thorough investigation of the nature of biological similarity.  Articulating the definition and causes associated with any homology concept ensures that the pluralistic approach advocated here is neither relativistic nor defeatist, but generative of fruitful biological research.
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1. Introduction
The term ‘homologue’ was first formally defined as “the same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function” (Owen 1843, cited in Donoghue 1992 and others), although the concept and variants thereof can be detected in much earlier Western thought, from Plato and Aristotle onward (Panchen 1994).  There has since been considerable debate over the exact nature of the terms ‘same’, ‘organ’, ‘form’, and ‘function’ in the formulation of homology concepts by biologists in different fields, but these concepts remain among the most important theoretical tools in the biological sciences.
Many continue to take a monistic approach to homology, searching for a single homology concept that is applicable to all disciplines within biology (Patterson 1982; van Valen 1982; Roth 1988; Bock 1989; Wagner 1989; Haszprunar 1992; Young 1993; Nelson 1994; Abouheif 1997; Brigandt 2002).  The ongoing nature of this search evinces its lack of success to date, and has led some authors to suggest that the search for homology concepts and criteria should be abandoned entirely in favor of more urgent and relevant biological questions (Wake 1999).
The list of authors who advocate a pluralistic approach to homology is substantially and strikingly shorter (Striedter and Northcutt 1991; Sluys 1996; Minelli 1998).  The goal of the present project is to provide further evidence and support for a pluralistic approach to homology, based upon the fundamentally pluralistic nature of biology.  I will examine the reasons for the continued failure of the monistic approach by studying three widely-used accounts.  Analysis of a biological case study will demonstrate both the inherent pluralism of biology and the complex nature of homology.  I will argue that concepts of homology, as tools for study, should be explicitly defined as integral parts of the theoretical and intellectual framework of the question at hand.  Further, I will suggest that the intrinsically pluralistic nature of the biological sciences (Gould and Lewontin 1979; Kitcher 1987) requires that approaches to homology concepts be pluralistic in order to be consistent with the nature of the science to which those concepts apply.

2. Failure of the Monistic Approach
An understanding of the following discussion requires clarification of the meaning of the term ‘homology concept’.  ‘Homology concept’ is here defined as a theoretical tool for the study of biological similarity, which forms an intrinsic part of the intellectual framework in which it is situated.  Complete homology concepts include a definition of what constitutes homology, criteria by which we are to recognize putative homologies, and causes for the phenomena observed.  As previously stated, there have been an enormous number of homology concepts proposed, and these can be broadly grouped into phylogenetic, developmental, and hierarchical accounts.  Examination of each of these accounts reveals that they are individually insufficient to explain all types of homology.

2.1. The Phylogenetic Account
This account is exemplified by the work of Patterson, who defines homology as “the relation which characterizes monophyletic groups” (1982, 21).  The corollary of this is that ‘homology’ and ‘synapomorphy’ are synonymous terms, an idea espoused by a number of authors (Lankester 1870; Bock 1989; Nelson 1994).  Patterson proposes a series of three tests to verify the robustness of a putative homology: the conjunction test; the similarity test; and the congruence test, each of which will be discussed in detail below.
Patterson’s tests of homology are problematic in a number of ways.  His conjunction test, which precludes the existence of two or more homologues in the same organism, would suggest that structures such as vertebrae or insect body segments are not homologous.  However, intuitively, these structures are similar, and it has been shown that they are patterned by a number of genes in the homeobox family that have arisen by duplication (Ruddle et al. 1994).  Thus vertebrae or insect body segments are the products of the same genes and the same developmental trajectories.  Further, duplication of genes in this family leads to failure of the conjunction test at the genetic level.  Patterson’s concept fails to account for these phenomena.
Patterson’s test of similarity requires that putative homologues be similar in location, ontogenetic origin, and composition.  It has been shown, however, that many structures considered homologous arise via different ontogenetic mechanisms, such as the anuran (frog and toad) eye lens which is discussed further below.  Patterson’s concept fails to account for different combinations of genetic and epigenetic phenomena that produce putatively homologous end products.
The test of congruence with other homologies is both useful and circular at the same time.  While an abundance of homologies that all suggest the same phylogeny do strengthen each other, conflicting homologies force a decision to be made about which should be retained and which discarded as homoplasies.  This decision rests on pre-existing hypotheses of similarity and relationship.  Further, phylogenies are generated using synapomorphies, and if these are the same as the ones being tested, then the test is not independent of the data and is meaningless.  The combination of tests for similarity and congruence in Patterson’s account led Donoghue (1992) to question whether similarity or common ancestry should have primacy in generating hypotheses of homology, a source of confusion that is further detrimental to Patterson’s concept.

2.2. The Developmental Account
This account is exemplified by the work of Wagner, who defines homologous structures as those that “share a set of developmental constraints, caused by locally acting self-regulatory mechanisms of organ differentiation.  These structures are thus developmentally individualized parts of the phenotype” (1989, 62).  In this concept, a putative homologue must be distinguishable by the same norms of reaction in all taxa that share the homologue.  These norms of reaction, which cause the structure to respond in the same way to environmental stimuli during development, are the cause of the homology.
This account is an improvement over Patterson’s, because it allows for serial homologues such as vertebrae and insect body segments, and for sexually differentiated homologues such as testis and ovary.  Wagner’s account also allows for the effects of evolution.  Ideas very similar to these have been suggested by Roth (1988; 1994), and both authors rely heavily on the idea that homology represents continuity of information (van Valen 1982).  Both authors, in contrast to Patterson, emphasize causality in their homology concepts.
This account remains problematic, however.  How do we treat structures such as a lizard’s original tail and its regenerated tail (incorporating a cartilaginous rod rather than vertebrae), when these arise via very different developmental pathways and are subject to very different developmental constraints?  Wagner’s concept fails to account for this phenomenon.  Further, at what point do we consider a structure to be sufficiently individualized, i.e. at the cell level, at the organ level, etc?  Wagner’s account fails to sufficiently explicate the criteria by which homologues are recognized.

2.3. The Hierarchical Account
A third account is exemplified in the work of Abouheif (1997), who proposes that homology is best tackled in a hierarchical manner.  He suggests that conflicting ideas of similarity, such as structural, developmental, or genetic, be “analyzed simultaneously within a phylogenetic framework” (Abouheif 1997, 405).  Hypotheses of homology are generated by using appropriate similarity criteria, such as those of the previous accounts discussed here, for each hierarchical level being studied.  These putative homologies are then mapped onto a phylogeny along with other traits, and those that co-vary with the phylogeny can be considered verified homologies.  The success of this approach depends upon the quality of the phylogeny used, and upon the ability to discover putative homologies at each of the proposed hierarchical levels (Abouheif 1997).
The hierarchical approach attempts to gather information from a variety of levels and unite them to discover homologous traits, instead of suggesting, as have the previous two accounts (Patterson 1982; Wagner 1989), that certain levels should be given primacy over others.  Despite this, however, the goal continues to be one overarching homology hypothesis that encompasses all levels based upon phylogenetics.  Reliance upon a phylogeny, itself generated by criteria of similarity, causes this account to suffer from the same circularity and non-independence problems inherent in Patterson’s work.
Most importantly, it has been shown repeatedly that a strictly hierarchical view of biological processes is flawed (Minelli 1998).  Factors acting outside the organism itself, such as environmental effects on phenotype, can affect the outcome of genetic and developmental processes.  Moreover, other factors acting at various levels of the hierarchy, such as gene duplication, autonomous vs. non-autonomous gene expression, and ontogenetic re-patterning, can disrupt hierarchical behavior of biological systems (Minelli 1998).  There are many factors that upset the linear mapping of genes onto developmental and morphological traits.  This account will, therefore, fail more often that not due to the uncoupling of some levels from others.

Although the representative accounts outlined here are very useful in attacking certain aspects of the problem, all three strive, implicitly or explicitly, to provide a definitive, superior account of homology, despite Brigandt’s (2002) acknowledgement that such an account may be unknowable or non-existent.  Careful scrutiny of this monistic approach reveals that while these accounts are functional in the domains in which they were developed, attempts to extend their scope beyond their original bailiwicks are highly problematic.  Some accounts are about pattern (Patterson 1982), others are about process (Wagner 1989; Abouheif 1997), but all have been so far unsuccessful in their monistic approach to the concept of homology.  I will argue below that this failure is symptomatic of the pluralistic nature of biology, and that rather than searching for an overarching concept, these individual concepts should be retained for study in the domain to which they belong.  Further, use of multiple homology concepts will aid in achieving a better understanding of variably interconnected biological systems.

3. The Pluralistic Nature of Biology
Many workers see the biological sciences as ideal ground for discovery of a ‘unified theory’, similar to theories being developed in other sciences such as physics (Longino 2002).  It is important to bear in mind, however, that biology is the study of life, and the study of animate entities by necessity entrains a number of unpredictable variables.  In addition, the study of biology must operate on a number of levels, which are both integrated and independent to different degrees, and cannot be regarded as rigidly hierarchical and interdependent (Minelli 1998).  To whit, one cannot have an eye without a series of developmental events, and one cannot have a series of developmental events without nucleotide sequences.  Therein lies the hierarchy.  At the same time, however, the same nucleotide sequence may affect a number of different developmental events leading to very different structures, or different developmental pathways may produce the same structure, and therein lies the independence.
Kitcher (1987, 190) has stated that “nature may be diverse even in its diversity”, and that there is no fundamental characteristic of organisms or biological phenomenon that can be extracted and given precedence over any other.  Biology is, therefore, a pluralistic science, and the degree of separation and integration of various biological entities and phenomena forces the tailoring of theories and hypotheses to specific cases.  Darwin himself (1859) advocated a pluralistic approach to the study of evolution, one of the most unified theories in biology, by stating that while natural selection may be the main mechanism by which organisms evolve, it is by no means the only factor at work.  Rather, a plurality of factors comes into play, and often these do not act in concert with one another (Gould and Lewontin 1979).  Because of this, the biological world cannot be divided up into neat categories, but rather sorts into a multitude of overlapping and incongruent divisions that are dependent upon the entities and phenomena under study.  This pluralistic spirit has been embraced explicitly by relatively few authors, although it is emphasized in various forms by some (e.g. Kitcher 1987; Ereshefsky 1998; Mishler and Brandon 1998) in addressing conceptually similar problems such as the species concept, as well as the general nature of science (e.g. Dupré 1993).
	Pluralism in biology entrains a plurality of perspectives on the study of biology, and leads to a plurality of homology concepts.  The lack of superiority of one biological entity or phenomenon over another precludes there being any one concept of homology that is superior to others.  Given that we cite homologies to explain relations, a homology concept must be specific to the level or phenomenon that is being explained.  That a particular concept does not extend across all facets of biological similarity does not detract from its value in answering biological questions.  Rather, a diversity of homology concepts will help broaden our understanding of biological phenomena.

3.1. Case Study: Lens Induction in Anurans
Analysis of real biological examples helps to illustrate the intricacies and complications of homology in biology.  Consider the development of the eye lens in frogs and toads.  Based upon early experiments, it appeared that the optic vesicle is necessary for the induction of the lens in the frog Rana fusca.  Further experimentation revealed that a number of anuran species can generate a lens in the absence of an optic vesicle, including species congeneric with those requiring the vesicle’s presence (Jacobson and Sater 1988).  The genus Bufo, for example, contains species that both do (Bufo bufo) and do not (Bufo regularis) form the lens in the absence of the optic cup.  It has now been shown that different series of inductive and suppressive interactions are responsible for lens formation, and that the optic vesicle plays only a supportive role in lens development (Jacobson and Sater 1988).  Thus many of the developmental mechanisms inherent in the occurrence of eyes in anurans are non-homologous, but it is very difficult to defend a hypothesis of non-homology between the eyes of two anuran species of the same genus.
Lens induction in anurans provides a classic example of the failure of individual accounts to fully explain homology, while highlighting each account’s ability to contribute positively to its understanding.  It is apparent that anuran eyes, while they are developmentally individualized parts of the phenotype as required by Wagner (1989), do not share the same developmental constraints.  They are homologous on some, but not all, hierarchical levels as required by Abouheif (1997).  Finally, anuran eyes pass Patterson’s (1982) test of congruence with other homologies, while failing the ontogenetic origin aspect of the test of similarity, since the eyes in each species are developing in radically different ways.  Thus while it seems that the eyes of congeneric anurans must represent an obvious example of homology, no single homology concept is able to properly account for the observed similarity.  However, each of the accounts of homology presented here is applicable to a particular facet of the study of anuran eyes.

Homology, referring to any and all forms of biological similarity, can be identified in many ways and in many places: the genetic code, the fossil record, extant animals, developmental pathways, complete structures, parts of structures, behaviors, and functions, to name but a few.  There exist many more examples of biological phenomena that cannot be explained by reference to a single homology concept.  The myriad of places where homology lurks is symptomatic of the myriad of systems at work in biology, and homology concepts that explain one system will not necessarily be useful in explaining another.  A complete picture of biological phenomena thus requires multiple homology concepts.

4. The Right Tool for the Job
In the preceding discussion, I have identified the pluralistic nature of both the biological sciences and of homology.  The numerous interconnected yet independent systems at work motivate the study of homology at numerous levels.  Rather than being disheartened by the ongoing, fruitless search for an overarching concept of homology, however, I suggest that taking a pluralistic approach to homology concepts as investigative tools provides the best approach to the study of biological similarity.  In this approach, a homology concept appropriate to the problem at hand is carefully and explicitly articulated as an integral part of the intellectual framework in which the investigation is taking place.  This articulation must include a definition of what constitutes homology, criteria by which we are to recognize putative homologies, and causes for the phenomena observed.
The adoption of a pluralistic approach to homology in the biological sciences is not intended to usher in an ‘anything goes’ mentality.  If a homology concept does not include an explicit definition, operational criteria, and independently testable hypotheses of causality, then the utility of the concept as a whole is compromised.  Additionally, explicit articulation of all components of the homology concept allows critical scrutiny of any study involving homology.  In this way, the homology concept appropriate for the question at hand becomes ‘the right tool for the job’, and the pluralistic approach is a proactive and investigatively interesting one as opposed to being, as some have suggested (e.g. Ghiselin 1987), merely defeatism and resort to relativism and subjectivity.
I now revisit the case study of the anuran eye lens in the context of this approach to homology.  A homology concept designed as an investigative tool to study the development of the eyes in anurans might be formulated as follows:
Definition: morphological structures whose overall forms, as well as their component parts, closely resemble each other in physical appearance, are homologous.  Thus the eyes of Bufo bufo and Bufo regularis are homologous structures.
Criteria: the resemblance among structures is sufficient to exclude other structures from similar comparisons; the structures are located in the same topographical position in each specimen; the structures function in a broadly similar fashion (i.e. photoreception).  Thus we can recognize the eyes of Bufo bufo and Bufo regularis as homologous.
Cause: common ancestry.  Thus we understand the reason for the presence of the homologues in both species.
Using this homology concept as an investigative tool, we can study the reasons behind the divergence of developmental pathways leading to anuran eyes, without being encumbered by the lack of homology at the developmental level.
A different homology concept allows the study of a different aspect of anuran eyes, namely their ancestry.  Such a concept could be formulated as follows:
Definition: structures that have arisen via identical sequences of developmental events are homologous.  Thus the eyes of Bufo bufo and Bufo regularis are not homologous.
Criteria: developmental pathways involve the same timing, onset, and offset of events; signaling molecules and mechanisms are the same; embryos are developing under identical environmental conditions.  Thus we can recognize that eyes of Bufo bufo and Bufo regularis are not homologous.
Cause: common ancestry.  Thus the non-homologous eyes of Bufo bufo and Bufo regularis arose separately.
Using this homology concept we can study the evolution of eyes, perhaps through selective pressure generated by a need to capture moving prey, and we have the impetus for re-evaluating the validity of the genus Bufo.
These examples show that an explicitly-stated homology concept can be a very valuable tool in studying biological questions, and demonstrate how the use of multiple homology concepts provides the freedom to investigate the complexity of the biological world.  Careful articulation of definitions, criteria, and causes will make the homology concept being used ‘the right tool for the job’, and will allow exploration of multiple aspects of biological similarity.

5. Objections and Responses
Arguments for the use of pluralism in science often generate negative responses from the monistic camp (e.g. Ghiselin 1987; Hull 1987).  The standard objections to pluralism are that it is relativistic and subjective, and as such can lead only to confusion, ambiguity and problems of communication.  In effect, the concern is that pluralism is far too much of an ‘anything goes’ approach to science (Ghiselin 1987; Hull 1987), with some going so far as to suggest that pluralism is actually destructive in science (Hull 1987).  This is not the case according to the account presented here.  As other advocates of pluralistic approaches to the biological sciences have stated (e.g. Ereshefsky 1998), it is the responsibility of each worker to clearly define the framework within which he or she is operating.  Rather than creating a communication barrier, this will in fact bring increased clarity and represent an improvement over the present state of affairs, in which homology concepts are seldom clearly articulated in conjunction with the investigation at hand.  Allowing a diversity of ideas on homology introduces a new richness of theoretical perspective, similar to the diversity required by Longino (2002) in her account of the social nature of scientific inquiry.  The approach to homology presented here is emphatically not an ‘anything goes’ proposal, and requires explicit and responsible articulation of the definition, criteria, and causes associated with any homology concept.  These must be made available and defended in an open forum (Longino 2002).

6. Conclusions and Prospectus
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